Nima Fazeli

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POSITIONS

Paris School of Business	**Paris, Fracne**
Assistant Professor of Finance	2020-
ESSEC Business School	**Cergy, France**
Associate Lecturer in Economics	2017-2020

EDUCATION

ESSEC Business School and University of Cergy-Pontoise   **Cergy, France**

PhD in Economics   2020

– Fields: Industrial Organization, Financial Economics

– Dissertation: Essays in Industrial Organization of Information Intermediaries; Supervisors: Prof. Régis Renault, Prof. Gorkem Celik

Master of Business Administration Research, ESSEC Business School   2014

Master (M2) in Economic Analysis, University of Cergy-Pontoise   2013

Allameh Tabatabaï University   **Tehran, Iran**

MSc in Economics   2011

BSc in Economics   2008

RESEARCH SEE LAST PAGE FOR ABSTRACTS

Working papers (single-authored):

– Platform Design in Targeted Advertising, 2019 (Link)

  * Proposes a theoretical model of strategic behavior of ad-finaced platform in designing its matching algorithms
  * Demonstrates that platform can enhance consumer welfare in situations where consumers' favourite firm has weak incentives to advertise
  * Presented at: Digital Economics 2020 (Paris, Scheduled), PhD workshop on Economics of Digitization 2020 (Toulouse, Scheduled), EARIE 2019 (Barcelona), ADRES 2019 (Marseille), ESSEC 2018

– Competition in Certification Markets, 2019 (Link)

  * A theoretical model of competition among information intermediaries applied to credit rating industry
  * Shows that competition can lead to differentiation in certification standards and derives implications for financial regulation
  * Presented at : European Securities and Markets Authority (Paris 2018), ADRES 2018 (Paris), PSE IO Summer School 2016 (Paris)

– Conflicts of Interest in Investor-paid Credit Ratings, 2020 (Link)

  * Empirical investigation of incentives of an *investor-paid* credit rating agency in comparison to *issuer-paid* counterparts
  * Provides evidence that an investor-paid rating agency is also subject to biased ratings due to conflict of interests not with investors but with regulators

Work in progress and joint papers:

– Risk-sharing in block-chain mining pools; joint with Bastien Buchwalter

– Credit ratings and civil liability; Joint with Vlad-Andrei Porumb

– Optimal renegotiation-proof cost-sharing contracts

Other Academic Activity

Referee Services: Journal of Financial Regulation

Participation in Academic and Professional Conferences: Digital Economics (Telecom-ParisTech, 2019); New Frontiers of Antitrust (Concurrence Inst. 2018, Paris); PSE Industrial Organization Summer School 2016 (Paris); Auctions Theory workshop (ESSEC 2018); 3rd International Meeting in Law and Economics 2016 (Paris)

Other services: Organization team of the Conference of French Association of Experimental Economics (2016); Business PhD in France conferences (2015-16); ESSEC internal doctoral student seminars and poster sessions (2016); ESSEC PhD program representative for the AACSB evaluations of ESSEC (2017)

Teaching

ESSEC Business School

Lecturer, *Business Economics* (Grande École), Spring 2019, 20 *(4x25 hrs)*, Evaluations 4.1/5 (School avg. 3.5/5)

Lecturer, *Macroeconomics* (BBA), Winter 2016, 2017, 2018 *(6x30 hrs)*, Evaluations 4.5/5 (School avg. 3.7/5)

Lecturer, *Intro. to Economics* (Masters and BBA), Fall 2017 *(45 hrs)*, Evaluations 4.4/5 (School avg. 3.0/5)

Teaching Assistant, *Business Economics* (Masters), Winter 2016

Teaching Assistant, *Microeconomics* (Masters, PhD), Fall 2014, 2015, 2016

SciencesPo Paris

Instructor, *Energy Economics Tutorial* (Masters), Spring and Fall 2017 *(2x12 hrs)*

Working Experience

Lecturer; ESSEC Business School; Cergy, France. 2017-20

Research Assistant for Giuseppe Berlingieri; *Concentration in Thin Markets*. 2018

Research Assistant for Patricia Langohr; *Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies*. 2015

Economic Analyst; TEM Investments; Tehran, Iran. 2011-2012

Research Assistant; National Center for Competition, Tehran, Iran. 2010-2011

Skills

Software and Programming: Mathematica (proficient); Stata (proficient); R; Python; Familiar with F#, Haskell, Lisp

Other tools: Excel and Office Suit; Sublime Text; Git; Pandoc; LaTeX

Language proficiency: English (Fluent), French (Fluent), Spanish (Beginner), Persian (Native)

References

Prof. Régis Renault
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Prof. Gorkem Celik
ESSEC Business School
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Prof. Wilfried Sand-Zantman
Toulouse School of Economics
wsandz@tse-fr.eu

Prof. Frédéric Jenny
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RESEARCH PAPERS

Platform Design in Targeted Advertising

Abstract

Firms compete for slots on an ad-financed platform by paying the platform to display their ads. In its design, the platform decides on its "matching quality" by choosing how much weight to give to each firm's payment while taking into account consumers' preferences. Increasing the quality makes the platform more desirable to the consumers, but also decreases its ad revenue per consumer since it softens competition for exposure among firms. In the optimal design, the platform actively mismatches (matches) the firm with high (low) profit per match by decreasing (increasing) the weight that its payment carries. When consumers' favorite firm enjoys a higher profit per match than its rival, a *neutral* policy in which the platform does not influence matching, improves consumer welfare. The platform is welfare enhancing however, when the consumers' preferred firm earns little per match. Moreover, better information about consumer tastes improves consumer welfare because the platform mismatches the better firm less often.

Keywords: platform design, two-sided markets, advertising contest

Competition in Certification Markets

Abstract

This paper presents a theoretical model of competition between information intermediaries applied to credit rating industry. Sellers rely on intermediaries to credibly communicate their quality to buyers. Intermediaries are strategic and compete in fees as well as their certification standards i.e. how strict they are in awarding a certification. Choices of fees and certification standards induce a signalling game between buyers and sellers where through their choice of intermediary, sellers can convey information about their quality to buyers. In equilibrium, intermediaries set differentiated certification standards. The leader sets a high standard and the follower sets the minimum standard of certification. This serves to relax price competition and leads to a two-tier market structure where high (low) quality sellers opt for intermediary with high (low) quality standards. Further, I empirically test the predictions of the theoretical model in the credit rating market of European commercial banks. The empirical results confirm the prediction of the theoretical model that the credit rating agencies use differentiated rating standards in this market.

Keywords: certification, information intermediaries, signalling, rating agency

Conflicts of Interest in Investor-paid Credit Ratings

Abstract

This paper investigates whether an *investor-paid* credit rating model leads to rating inflation. Using the corporate bond ratings of Egan-Jones Rating Company, I find evidence that an investor-paid rating agency tends to upgrade bonds that offer a higher yield. This suggests that an investor-paid rating agency can cater to the needs of the investors who *reach for yield* allowing them to bypass capital requirements of holding such bonds. This result support the theory that rating-contingent regulations in financial markets create incentives for inflated ratings, regardless of compensation structure of rating agencies.

Keywords: financial regulations, reaching for yield, credit ratings, rating agencies

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